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Liner shipping industry have experienced different era from traditional conference 
to current strategic alliance. Seeking the effect on the actual shipping market 
resulting abolition of traditional conference has been analyzed through different 
types of perspectives. Furthermore, study of future mode of alliances should be 
studied. 
 
This paper introduces development of traditional shipping conference to current 
strategic alliance and explains their fundamental difference through multiple 
perspectives. Understanding process of development, how the scale economy 
effected liner shipping market, intensified market competition, and regulation 
issues. 
 
Through multiple perspectives, major shipping companies are now in a strategic 
alliances and market share of those alliances is continuously growing and resulting 
intensify of market competition. However, unlike shipping conference, members 
between same strategic alliances are still considered as separated companies with 
independent rules and strategies. This is why the strategic alliance does not violate 
antitrust rules. As a result, in this era of overcapacity and low freight rate, it is 
essential for shipping companies to join strategic alliance. 
 
KEYWORDS: Maritime conference, Strategic alliance, Freight rate, Scale 
economy, Antitrust rules, Overcapacity 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Containerization of cargo, which was originated in 1950s, has been regarded as one 
of the distinct trends and development of global shipping industry in the last decades 
(Deloitte, 2015). The most distinct feature of Containerization is its scale economy. 
Like other transportation model, container shipping benefits from scale of economy, 
as invention of container, large quantity of goods have been able to be transported at 
one time per a sail, in terms of lower cost per twenty-foot equivalent unit, TEU. Such 
development enabled shipping market to maximize its utilization and optimize the 
service routes in terms of economical way of transport of cargo. Also, faster transit 
with lower cost in relevant business sectors, such as terminal handling charges, 
resulted improvement of service reliability (Economics of containerization, Alan E. 
Branch, 1988 pp.79). For achieving the aforementioned scale economy, the global 
shipping industry has experienced the largest increase in average container ship size. 
Additionally, Alliances and cooperation has also been viewed as a critical tool to 
pursuing the scale economy, that is, a select number of shipping companies have 
come to dominate the market through takeovers and alliances (Deloitte, 2015). 
With respect to the organizational pattern of shipping company cooperation, there are 
historically two basic types: the shipping conference and strategic alliance. The 
shipping conference appear in 19th to cope with trade between England and India. 
Shipping conference is a group of shipping companies involved in providing regular 
services at certain prices in certain routes. Two or more shipping companies enter 
into agreement or contracts on freight related conditions with aim of maintaining 
economic status among the members by minimizing internal competition and 
enhancing their monopolistic strength externally. In addition, it has an international 
character and adopted methods such as freight agreement, ship charter agreement, 
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and joint calculation agreement, and such restrictions are naturally in violation of the 
Monopoly Law for certain countries that prohibit monopolization. That is, the shipping 
conference, which had controlled freight rates, transporting volume, and other 
conditions, destroyed confidence in providing high quality services. Therefore, 
counties shifted their policies to regulate shipping conference to compete in the liner 
shipping market. Thus, the shipping conference, which once controlled liner shipping 
market, lost control of the U.S. in 1998 and Europe in 2008, respectively, and freight 
rates became more autonomous. Since then, the world’s shipping companies have 
been in a more competitive environment, and the later practice further demonstrate 
that simply banning will eventually intensify competition between the companies. 
Meanwhile, the routes are becoming wider and the number of ports frequency that 
shipping companies have to make regular stops is increasing. Shipping lines have 
become larger to achieve economies of scale, and large scale of capital is needed to 
hold such big vessels. In particular, from the late 20th century, the scope of shipping 
company’s service expanded due to the competition for mass transportation thorough 
the bigger size vessels, and combined transportation service. 
With respect to the organizational pattern of shipping company cooperation, there are 
historically two basic types: the shipping conference and strategic alliance. The 
shipping conference appear in the 18th century. Shipping conference is a group of 
shipping companies involved in providing regular services at certain prices in certain 
routes. Two or more shipping companies enter into agreement or contracts on freight 
related conditions with aim of maintaining economic status among the members by 
minimizing internal competition and enhancing their monopolistic strength externally. 
In addition, it has an international character and adopted methods such as freight 
agreement, ship charter agreement, and joint calculation agreement, and such 
restrictions are naturally in violation of the Monopoly Law for certain countries that 
prohibit monopolization. That is, the shipping conference, which had controlled freight 
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rates, transporting volume, and other conditions, destroyed confidence in providing 
high quality services. Therefore, counties shifted their policies to regulate shipping 
conference to compete in the liner shipping market. Thus, the shipping conference, 
which once controlled liner shipping market, lost control of the U.S. in 1998 and 
Europe in 2008, respectively, and freight rates became more autonomous. Since then, 
the world’s shipping companies have been in a more competitive environment, and 
the later practice further demonstrate that simply banning will eventually intensify 
competition between the companies. Meanwhile, the routes are becoming wider and 
the number of ports frequency that shipping companies have to make regular stops 
is increasing. Shipping lines have become larger to achieve economies of scale, and 
large scale of capital is needed to hold such big vessels. In particular, from the late 
20th century, the scope of shipping company’s service expanded due to the 
competition for mass transportation thorough the bigger size vessels, and combined 
transportation service. 
Against the aforementioned back ground, the strategic alliance has emerged as a 
substitute for the shipping conference. A strategic alliance is to form a complementary 
and continuous cooperative relationship based on the unique competitive advantage 
of each company has. According to the previous researches, almost every top 
container shipping companies have joined the strategic alliances. For instance, 
currently there are mainly 3 strategic alliances exist in liner market, which are 2M, 
Ocean Alliance, and THE alliance. Alliances have become a major feature of container 
shipping over the past few years. While cooperation among liner carriers in the past 
has taken the form of price and capacity adjustment, but while past two decades, this 
alliance has emerged consist of rival companies of sharing the ships to create 
operational efficiency and a broad range of services. Previous alliances, decade ago, 
has been formed between middle and small sized companies to seek economies of 
scale but nowadays, there are only 3 mega-alliances exist and those affiliated 
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companies are also one of the largest shipping companies in the world(International 
Transport Forum, 2018). 
Through strategic alliances, shipping companies can promote low prices and 
extensive service coverage with economies of scale. The high fixed cost structure of 
the maritime transport is one of the main arguments that the shipping companies 
should cooperate together and shipping alliances are the tools in acquiring larger 
vessels and sharing those spaces together to maximize utilization. 
Recent characteristic of the global shipping market is that each company is competing 
through alliance. Based on the alliance, getting bigger in size became as a strategic 
step in terms of to enjoy economy of scale. Given the appearance of strategic alliance, 
the following concerns merit attention: 
1)First，what is the impact of transformation from traditional shipping conference to 
strategic alliance? 2) Second, could strategic alliance leverage the economic scales 
to improve the competitiveness? 3) Third, do strategic alliance in violation of the 
Monopoly Law and be prohibited again? Considering the aforementioned, thus the 
proper research is need to explore the necessity of strategic alliance and its impact 
from multiple perspectives. 
 
1.2Literature Review 
Main researches are Thai (2014), Jiang (2018), Rau (2017), Wang (2015), Varbanova 
(2017), Ding (2009). Wang (2015) has described the weakening of shipping 
conference as the enactment of the U.S Foreign Shipping Reform Act. As a result, the 
maritime conference was abolished and instead strategic alliance were spreading as 
new alternatives. 
Also, there have been researchers who have studied profit wise approach. Wang 
(2016) has introduced the profit-sharing model of strategic alliances, Notteboom 
(2017) has examined how changes in shipping operation result to the global port of 
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calls, especially intercontinental network. Zheng (2017) has proposed cost allocation 
of container shipping alliance, especially for CKYH. Park (2018) has approached 
sales & purchase as a fundamental requirement for shipping companies to have 
sustainable development and competitiveness in shipping market. 
Some researchers discussed the main types and forms of maritime conference. 
Midoro and Pitto (2000) have pointed out that M&A are very important for shipping 
companies to secure global market dominance. They have also pointed that structure 
of strategic alliance has fundamentally insufficient to provide acceptable level of 
stability. This instability is result of structure of companies getting more complex while 
certain level of competition between alliance members. Karmeric (2010) also made 
detailed comments on the ship-sharing agreement among shipping companies in the 
way they formed an alliance. Lee (2017) said that the integration process of liner 
shipping consisted largely of strategic alliances, vessel-sharing agreements, slot 
charter, and M&A. Sjostrom (2004) investigated how much the conference model is 
effective. Slack (2010) examined how container shipping market has developed in 
terms of formation of conferences and strategic alliances. He pointed that the 
emergence of alliances have changed the market, such issues are, broaden service 
routes and building larger vessels. 
Doi (2004) have mentioned that shipping conference is a tool to make equilibrium of 
container shipping market so that it does not become unstable. Aymelek (2014) 
mentioned that it is known fact that due to global trend of concerning environmental 
issues and related regulations have driven changes of strategies of shipping 
companies. Also, in terms of to enjoy scale economy, their strategy become to operate 
larger vessels to fulfill both scale economy and environmental issues. 
Huang (2013) pointed formation of alliance is a tool for the shipping companies to 
become larger in size and to pursue larger in market share. But still joining strategic 
alliances could be almost impossible for certain companies with smaller size and 
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market share. However, strategic alliances give member carriers become larger in 
size and also improve of business reputation as shippers have tendency to choose 
companies affiliated to alliance. Ultimately, strategic alliances allow shipping 
companies to reduce cost while increase revenue. 
Therefore, by means of the research on trends, prospects and policies related to the 
shipping alliance, the changes in regulations related to the shipping alliance were 
studied and the factors related to the market for the liner were analyzed. The main 
conclusions are that the abolition of maritime conference led the market into fierce 
competition among liner companies mainly for the collapse of freight market. In terms 
of economy of scale, few leading companies have higher competitiveness over others 
with bigger sized fleets with lower cost per carriage of a container. Those who lost 
their competitiveness have bankrupted or process of M&A has been done and still 
ongoing which leads enhance of market share for mega carriers. 
 
1.3 The structure of the research 
This paper will consist of 6 chapters. In Chapter 1, the research background, the 
current research situation and research approach have been described; Chapter 2 
presents the summary of evolution process of conference and strategic alliances; 
from chapter 3 to 5, the main research issues have been concerned from multiple 
perspectives such as market, competitiveness and law. 
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Fig 1Dissertation Structure 
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2. From Conference to Alliance: Process 
2.1 Evolution 
UK-Calcutta conference established in year 1875 was usually described asthe first 
shipping conference in the modern sense. Table 1 presents the development history 
of shipping conferences. 
 
Table 2-1: Evolution of shipping conferences 
                                           (Source: compiled by the author) 
 
Historically, there were two main types of shipping conferences, namely open and 
closed conferences. The prominent difference between the two conferences is that 
the former welcomed any shipping company that wanted to be part of, while the latter 
could only allow entrants when the pledge to comply with certain conditions such as 
freight rates was fulfilled. Most of shipping conferences that have existed until recently 
can be seen as closed rather than open. Shipping conference has maintained its 
presence in the liner market with the advantages of freight rates and stability in supply 
of capacity. In the latter half of the 20th century, due to the expansion of ships and the 
development of multimodal transportation, shipping conferences began to be 
Year Major Development 
1875 Calcutta Conference was formed uniting 7 shipping companies  
1887 Far East Freight Conference (FEFC) was formed 
1916 US Shipping Conference was formed  
1974 375 shipping conferences were developed to unite 4,363 shipping companies 
1992 Asian Shipowners Forum, ASF: Australia, China, HK China, India, Japan, Korea, Taipei China, 
and Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association 
1995 Collapse of major Europe-Asia shipping lines coalitions 
1998 Majority of shipping companies retreated from shipping conferences 
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weakened with collapse of faith in the conference. Eventually, shipping conference 
began to breakdown in 1998 resulting from the revision of the U.S. Foreign Shipping 
Reform Act. In 2008 when the European Union announced the abolition of the 
shipping conference, it was completely abolished from the liner market. Through this 
process of change, the strategic alliance has emerged as a substitute for the shipping 
conference. A strategic alliance is to form a complementary and continuous 
cooperative relationship based on the unique competitive advantage each company 
has. In other words, since major liner companies are unable to establish a global 
logistics service network on their own in a short period of time, so they form a group 
of shipping companies to work with others to quickly react to the globalization of 
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Table 2-2Development of strategic alliances 
1996 2009 2012 2015 2020 
Global Alliance The New World G6 G6 2M 
APL APL/NOL APL/NOL APL/NOL MAERSK LINE 









NEDLLOYD   Hapag-Lloyd Hapag-Lloyd   
MISC   NYK NYK   
    OOCL OOCL   
Gland Alliance Gland Alliance MSC+CMA 2M Ocean Alliance 
Hapag-Lloyd Hapag-Lloyd MSC MAERSK LINE CMA-CGM 
NOL NYK CMA-CGM MSC COSCO 
NYK OOCL     EVERGREEN 
P&OCL       OOCL 




MAERSK CMA-CGM Hapag-Lloyd 
SEA-LAND P&O(Acquired)   CSCL Yang Ming 
      UASC ONE 
        HMM 
  CKYH CKYH CKYH   
  Hanjin Hanjin Hanjin   
  K-LINE K-LINE K-LINE   
  Yang Ming Yang Ming Yang Ming   
  COSCO COSCO COSCO   
    EVERGREEN EVERGREEN   
  (Source: compiled by the author) 
 
Basing on Table 1 and 2, the evolution process of strategic alliance could be further 
divided into five phases in terms of its composition.  
First phase, the global alliances emerged around 1995 and1996. The Global Alliance 
started in March 1995uniting APL, MOL, Nedlloyd, and MISC. In the following year 
Hapag-Lloyd, NOL, and NYK formed the Grand Alliance and OOCL joined the alliance 
afterwards. 
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Second phase, the 1stglobal alliances reorganization took place between 1997 and 
2000. In this period major liners have proceeded M&A with cooperation or competitors 
therefore it was inevitable for alliances restructure. Global M&A was made in January 
1997, P&OCL and Nedlloyd have merged into P&O Nedlloyd, after that Hanjintook 
over 70% share of DSR-Senator, and NOL took over APL. CMA acquired share of 
CGM and secured management control, and Hapag-Lloyd sold their ownership to 
Preussag to lay the foundation for financial management. In July 1999, the mother 
company of Maersk A.P. Moller group acquired Sea-Land’s container transport sector 
to forge into a mega carrier “Maersk-Sealand”. Evergreen acquired Lloyd Triestino in 
year 1998 and by the following year merged their son company Uniglory Marine. 
Third phase, the 2nd reorganization took place between 2001 and 2010. Hanjin joined 
CKY alliance in year 2002 and became CKYH which consisted of COSCO, K-Line, 
Yang Ming and Hanjin, totaling 337 fleets with 850 thousand TEUs. In year 2005, 
Maersk-Sealand launched Maersk Line by acquiring P&O Nedlloyd. Hereby, the world 
maritime alliances were reorganized into 3 major alliances, namely the New World 
Alliance, Grand Alliance and CKYH, and 2 mega carriers, Maersk Line and Evergreen. 
Remaining other carriers such as CMA CGM, CSCL, MSC and Zim maintained 
solitary position. 
Forth phase, the 3rd reorganization took place between 2011 and 2014. The New 
World Alliance and Grand Alliance united into G6. In year 2014Evergreen joined 
CKYH to become CKYH+E. Maersk, and MSC were formed into 2M alliance and on 
the other hand, CMA CGM, CSCL and UASC were formed into Ocean 3 alliance. 
Fifth phase, the 4th reorganization took place between 2015 and 2020. There was 
continuous maritime shipping depression after the 3rd reorganization of alliances, 
shipping alliances were dramatically restructured to overcome the situation. 2M 
Alliance were forged into 2M+2H with Hyundai Merchant Marine and Hamburg Süd. 
China COSCO Shipping and Evergreen OOCL entered Ocean3 alliance and the 
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name was changed to the Ocean Alliance. On the other hand, CKYHE was 
transformed into THE Alliance, consisting of Hapag-Lloyd, K-Line, MOL NYK and 
Yang Ming. 
 
2.2 Comparison between Shipping Conference and Strategic Alliance 
Though the motivations of forming Shipping Conference and Strategic Alliance are 
similar, there still exist major differences on several aspects. The following presents 
such comparison. 
(1) Definition  
By definition, shipping conference refer to ship operators' organizations serving 
similar markets. They form cartels and provide regular shipping service as planned to 
regulate competition among each other and protect their markets from external 
attacks; while strategic alliance is a cooperative agreement engaging a group of 
ocean-going carriers. Through the global cooperation of their members, strategic 
alliances were formed to cover various trading routes. 
In particular, the biggest difference between the shipping conference and the strategic 
alliance is that the shipping conference is formed through the control of the volume of 
ships, while the strategic alliance mainly aimed at sharing the shipping volume 
through joint operation without such control or conciliation. 
(2) Time of Formation  
Shipping conferences were formed in the 19th century out of trades between Britain 
and its colony of India. And the first generation of strategic alliances was formed in 
1995, though formal large-scale of alliances were only formed after 2008.Essentially, 
strategic alliances are the substitute of shipping conference for continually exploring 
the scale economy after the abolition of the shipping conference. 
(3) Mode of Operation 
The operation mode of shipping conferences can be described as follows:  
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1) Deferred rebate system: it means that the carrier or the conference shipper 
rebates part of the rate in exchange for the shipper to deliver all or most of its 
goods to the carrier or the conference within the specified time;  
2) Dual rate contract: the shipper continues to use the lower rate granted by the 
conference within a certain period of time;  
3) Three decker rate system: the contract shipper who refuses to load non-
conference cargo but conference member’s cargo, will get an additional discount 
of 2.5% of the contract rate;  
4) Freight rebate system: those shippers who fulfill the commitment of loading 
members’ cargo will get a discount of 2.5% from the total contract freight every 
four months;  
5) Guarantee contract system: shippers are obligated to provide a fixed rate, but the 
conference promises that there will be no increase rate on the condition of limited 
shipping space and a rise in market rate. 
For shipping alliances, internally, ships are dispatched and shipping space is allocated 
as a whole, while externally the alliance announces a uniformed set of shipping 
schedule and port sequence. This mode of capacity allocation is more direct and 
powerful than the traditional mode of capacity quota implemented within a conference. 
In addition, members of an alliance cooperate through the way of capacity sharing, 
and the relationship between them comes closer and more stable. 
The aforementioned said revealed that the operation of shipping conference is tightly 
conciliation through the control of the volume of ships, while the strategic alliance 
mainly aimed at sharing the shipping volume through joint operation agreement. 
(4)Relationship between Members 
Shipping conference members try to eliminate competition as much as possible. 
However, members are not always frank with each other, and they sometimes allow 
shippers to pay less than the conference rates and classification fees. In order to 
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prevent this kind of behavior, the conference employs external "police" personnel to 
conduct spot check on members' integrity, so as to mitigate issues of weight 
underestimation or insufficient classification of goods. 
The strategic alliance enables the large shipping companies to fully utilize the 
resources with cooperation among the members, while the relatively small shipping 
companies can enjoy the wider range of service routes which they cannot provide by 
themselves. Operators establish cooperative relationship with each other and 
compete to optimize their profits. This kind of dynamic is called "competition and 
cooperation game". 
(5)  Relationship with the Shipper 
Fundamentally the shipping conference is a "debate conference", which imposes 
restrictions on the shipping companies participating in the conference. However, from 
the shipper's point of view, it is only a "pricing decision-making organization", which 
put the shipper at a disadvantage in the shipping contract. The contract between the 
shipper and the conference varies with type of conference and its monopoly strength. 
While for shipping alliances, although excess capacity in the liner sector has reduced 
freight rates, this reduction has been partially offset by additional surcharges for 
shippers. In addition, by limiting modes of transport, alliances have hindered the risk 
diversification strategy of shippers and freight forwarders. Due to the frequent 
restructuring of strategic alliances, potential cost saving advantages are often not fully 
utilized. Within the port, the purchasing power of the alliance members may cause 
destructive competition between terminal operators and other port service providers 
such as tugboat companies. This may reduce the rebate on investment of the port 
industry, leading to the decrease in smaller container ports and the even withdrawal 
of independent terminal operators and tugboat companies. In addition, by limiting 
modes of transport, alliances have hindered the risk diversification strategy of 
shippers and freight forwarders.  
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3.From Conference to Alliances: Scale Economy 
3.1 Prominent feature of Scale Economy 
(1) The increased size of container vessels 
According to statistics, though ships of 7,500-9,999TEU takes the largest proportion 
in the global container fleet, they only account for 19% of the total capacity of the fleet; 
ships of over 7,500TEU account for 51% of the total capacity of the entire container 
fleet. In addition, container ships of 12,500-14,999TEU accounts for about 14%. 
 
Fig.3-1 Fleet breakdown by TEU Size Range 
(Source：Alphaliner, Alphaliner Monthly Monitor, July 2018) 
 
 
Fig.3-2 Capacity breakdown by TEU Size Range 
(Source：Alphaliner, Alphaliner Monthly Monitor, July 2
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Fig.3-3 50 years of container ship growth 
             
The driving force for the increased size of the container vessels aforementioned is the 
realization of scale economy which is rooted from the increased size of vessels. Table 
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Table 3-1：Single container cost of different types of container ships 
Type of Container Ship TEU 
Single container cost 
（US dollars per TEU） 
Panamax 4,250 427 
Panamax 5,100 440 
Post-panamax I 5,700 408 
Post-panamax II 6,600 424 
Extra post-panamax I 8,400 376 
Extra post-panamax II 9,600 373 
Extra post-panamax III 9,449 390 
Extra post-panamax IV 10,000 371 
New Panamax 14,000 355 
（Source：Song Yuan, Research on ship types and scale economy of large container ships, Containerization,2006） 
 
In the light of the freight rate and operating cost of new container ships, the increasing 
upsizing of ships has suggested prominent scale economy. See the figures below for 
details: 
 
Fig. 3-4 Cost of new container ships by TEU         Fig. 3-5 Cost of annual operation per TEU  
（Source: Yang Qiuping et al., Study on the Limits of Large Size Ships, Chongqing Jiaotong University Journal, 
2020） 
 
According to Drewry statistics, in the second half of 2019, major liner companies in 
the world progressively ordered large-scale container ships. The number of orders 
has seen a sharp increase, forming prominent scale economy. 
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Fig. 3-6 Breakdown of container ship orders in 2019 
 
(2) Appearance of new container transportation mode 
With the upsizing of container ships, to improve efficiency and reduce costs 
becomes a key issue for container shipping organizations. One prominent 
phenomenon is the appearance of Hub-feeder Container Transportation mode. 
According to the schedule published by Drewry, the majority of trade routes 
are designed to be connected between hub ports, branch ports and feeder 
ports. 
 
Fig. 3-7 Layout of Trade Route 
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Herewith a Chinese case to further elaborate the aforementioned transportation mode. 
From 2005 to 2015, the container volume in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Tianjin, 
Qingdao, Ningbo, Dalian and other hub ports increased significantly and obtained an 
advantage. In the meanwhile, the container transportation in small and medium-sized 
ports had gradually matured, forming a stable feeding relationship with the main hub 
ports. Multiple open ports system and transportation pattern along the coastal areas 
were developed, releasing the cargo supply potential of small and medium-sized ports. 
A multi portal edge challenge mechanism was formed, and the development of a few 
regional hub ports was slowed down. The turn-over capacity by the secondary ports 
for hub ports was greatly enhanced, which relatively decentralized the distribution of 
container ports. But such small and medium-sized ports are often geographically 
close to hub ports and they co-exist with each other. (Source: Guo Jianke, et al. The 
Ranking, Size Distribution, and Networking of Chinese mainland Container Port 
System Since 1985, Geographical Research, 2019) 
Based on the distribution of shipping lines from 2005 to 2015, it can be found that the 
regional hub ports, mainly Qingdao Port, Dalian Port, Xiamen Port and Tianjin Port, played 
an important role in coordination and turn-over between local ports. Yantai Port, Suzhou 
Port and other ports had formed their branch ports, namely feeder port. The connection 
between hub port and feeder port had been enhanced. 
 
3.2Appearance of alliance in requirement of scale economy 
Facing the ever-developing trend pertaining to increased vessel size and changing 
hub-feeder transport mode, it would be difficult for a single shipping company to 
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As the shipping industry is characterized by capital intensive and low return on 
investment, the existence of shipping conferences is beneficial to both owners of 
cargo and shipowners. With forging shipping giants, strategic alliances invest in large-
scale and high-speed ships on the main routes, and actively opens up branch lines 
through the hub port, to achieve high shipping frequency, shorten turnover time, and 
more competitive range of ports of calls. Members of alliances mainly use their own 
terminals, so that the process of loading and discharging, transit and multimodal 
transport operations are guaranteed in terms of promptness, this factors leads 
alliance members to improve the service quality, putting alliances in a more 
advantageous condition. 
According to Drewry statistics, from 2018 to 2019, changes existed in the market 
share of the Pacific Line, Asia-Europe Line and Asia-Mediterranean Line. In particular, 
there was significant variations in the market share of Asia-Europe line. It can be found 
that all liner alliances are active in solicitation and grabbing market share, resulting in 
intense market competition. 
 
 
Fig. 3-8: Market share of the Pacific Line in 2019Fig. 3-9: Market share of the Pacific Line in 2018 
(Source: Drewry Maritime Research) 
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Fig. 3-10: Market share of the Asia-Europe Line in 2019   Fig. 3-11: Market share of the Asia-Europe Line in 2018 
(Source: Drewry Maritime Research) 
 
Fig 3-12: Market share of the Asia-Mediterranean Line in 2019   Fig 3-13: Market share of the Asia-Mediterranean Line in 2018 
(Source: Drewry Maritime Research) 
 
According to Drewry Report, from 2018 to 2019, there were also noticeable variations of 
market share among major liner companies.  
 
 
Fig 3-14: Market share of the Asia-South Asia Line in 2019   Fig 3-15: Market share of the Asia-South Asia Line in 2018 
(Source: Drewry Maritime Research) 
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Fig 3-16: Market share of the Europe-Middle East Line in 2019 Fig 3-17: Market share of the Europe-Middle East Line in 2018 
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4. From Conference to Alliances: Market Competition 
4.1 The situation of market competition 
Since 2008, with the impact from world financial crisis, the global economy and trade 
have kept in a downturn. See the Table 4-1 for global GDP growth rate and trade 
growth rate during 2010 to 2018. 
Table 4-1：Global GDP growth rate and trade growth rate in 2010-2018 
Year Global GDP growth rate Global trade growth rate 
2010 5.43% 14% 
2011 4.22% 5.5% 
2012 3.46% 2.5% 
2013 3.28% 3% 
2014 3.41% 2.5% 
2015 3.4% 2.8% 
2016 3.2% 1.7% 
2017 3.7% 3.6% 
2018（estimates） 3.9% 3.2% 
（Source：IMF, World Economic Outlook ,July2018; WTO, World Trade Statistical Review 2018, May 2018） 
Impacted by the economic downturn, the global container shipping capacity is 
beginning to show surplus. 
 
 
Fig.4-1 Supply and demand trend of global container MarketFig.4-2 Curve of shipping capacity of global container Market 
（Source：Drewry, Container Forecaster Q4, December 2017） 
 
Affected by the fierce market competition, the international container freight rate index 
has been kept at a low level.  
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Fig.4-3 CCFI indexes from 2008 to 2018 
（Source: Shanghai International Shipping Research Institute） 
 
 
Fig.4-4 Global container freight indexes from 2008 to 2018 
(Source：Alphaliner, Alphaliner Monthly Monitor, July 2018) 
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Fig.4-5 Charter rates of container ships  
(Source：Alphaliner, Alphaliner Monthly Monitor, July 2018) 
 
In order to alleviate the high press of the market competition, shipping companies 
should adopt various tools to strengthen their competiveness. For instance, with the 
opening of Suez Canal and the introduction of steam ships, both of them are more 
efficient than sailboats, resulting in the excess tonnage of ships. In order to ensure a 
large amount of profits from the market, shipown ers competed, causing freight to fall 
below the cost. This is the basic context in which the shipping conference was first 
shaped. The formation of strategic alliance came about after the 2008 economic crisis 
when shipping companies realized that under the negative economic conditions, they 
could not operate alone with limited numbers of vessel and equipment.  
 
4.2 The impact on the competiveness 
In this section, Porter’s model is utilized to analyze the impact of strategic alliance 
on the competitiveness of shipping companies. Porter's (1990) Diamond Model, first 
proposed in 1990, used four broad attributes, namely factor conditions; demand 
conditions; related and supporting industries; and firm strategy, structure, and 
rivalry; along with two additional variables of chance and government. Based on 
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Porter’s model, the impact on competitiveness of shipping companies, brought by 
the trend from conferences to strategic alliances, can be further elaborated as 
follows. 
From the perspective of factor condition, the shipping conference can reduce the price 
competition of shipping companies in the conference. Through freight agreement, 
cargo pooling agreement, intermodal agreement, and allocation of profits, the 
available resources of shipping companies are improved. The strategic alliance is 
mainly operated through the box sharing way, balancing the capacity between the 
shipping companies within the alliance. It could effectively reduce the operating cost 
of shipping companies while maintaining service frequency and quality. Since 2008, 
such alliances as combined with slow steaming strategies have worked well in cost 
control. 
From the perspective of demand factor, the competitiveness brought by the shipping 
conferences mainly reflected in obtaining more market share and higher pricing to 
obtain profits through the monopoly position of specific routes, instead of better 
attracting new customers to increase demand. For strategic alliance, it can not only 
bring lower operating costs to shipping companies, but also provide customers with 
diversified and quality services by sharing of slots within the alliance. Since it could 
retain reasonable market competition, on the demand side more customers choose 
shipping companies of alliances due to improved services. 
From the perspective of the supporting industry, the shipping conference stipulates 
the frequency of calls to specific ports along the route, which can reduce port 
congestion to a certain extent. However, due to the relatively complicated 
membership of the shipping conference, the joint bargaining effect of port loading and 
unloading fees cannot be achieved well, so there is no significant reduction in cost. 
Meanwhile, strategic alliance is a good resource sharing platform. Since most 
container shipping companies, such as Maersk and COSCO, have operating control 
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over more ports in the world, they can share port resources well to obtain better 
support services. As the liner market tends to be oligopolistic, for third-party 
supporting enterprises, such as port loading and unloading and container ordering, 
liner companies can get more competitive rate through negotiation advantages. 
From the perspective of firm strategy, structure, and rivalry condition, the shipping 
conference's main objective is to further squeeze out non-conference shipping 
companies from the market by setting floor freight rates, standardizing services, 
thereby gaining a monopoly advantage. Shipping conference can place comparative 
advantages to shipowner on higher profits. Strategic alliances can help shipping 
companies reduce their ship investment and lower operation costs. Through the way 
of resource sharing, the strategic alliance can provide more efficient and 
comprehensive service, and get higher profit through the strategic decision of 
competing game. 
From the perspective of chance, demand for freight before 2008 is greater than supply, 
so the shipping company as a carrier has greater negotiation advantages. Based on 
a higher market share, shipping companies can master certain pricing power. The 
container transportation market gradually tends to oligopoly, which makes the number 
of corresponding trade routes partners significantly reduced. As a result, the shipping 
alliances formed by a few shipping companies can gain an advantageous market 
share and sustainable development in the low-price market. Furthermore, the 
performances of Maersk &CMA-CGM have been selected to support the 
aforementioned. 
Considering the big contribution of conference and alliances on the competiveness of 
shipping companies, shipping companies are seeking to expand to strengthen their 
cost competitiveness and complement their business portfolio. Top shipping 
companies are seeking to scale up by securing M&A and larger vessels, which has 
become a trigger to change the 4 alliances into 3 alliances system. The market share 
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of the top five shipping companies rose from 45.4 percent in 2012 to 54 percent in 
2016 and 63.9 percent in 2017. Moreover, the top seven companies, including 
Evergreen and Japan’s ONE which established an integration in 2017, had a 
combined market share of 16.15 million TEU and 75.7 percent. In fact, large shipping 
companies dominate the container shipping market (KMI 2017). Currently, top 9 
companies in 3 major alliances have over 80 percent of market share. Table 3 
presents strategic alliances and their market share. 
Table 4-2Major 3 strategic alliances and their market share 
 
（Source：Alphaliner, AlphalinerTop 100, April 2020） 
For further elaborate the aforementioned phenomenon, two cases depicted by table 
4-3 and 4-4 are selected.  
Table 4-3 Maersk Issues 
（Source: compiled by the author） 
-. 2011-A.P. Moller-Maersk creates ' Seago Line' to cater for intra Europe services 
-. 2014-A.P. Moller-Maersk CMA-CGM and MSC formed the P3 alliance 
-. 2015-A.P. Moller-Maersk creates ' SeaLand' to cater for intra America services 
-. 2015-A.P. Moller-Maersk and CMA-CGM formed the 2M alliance 
-. 2017-A.P. Moller-Maersk purchases Hamburg Sud 
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Table 4-4 CMA-CGM Issues 
（Source: compiled by the author） 
 
Furthermore, figure 4-6 and 4-6 demonstrated the following facts. Maersk merged 
with Sealand to become the second largest shipping company in 1997, and in 2005 it 
further merged P&OCL. Maersk acquired Hamburg Sud in 2017 to strengthen its 
competitiveness in the European market and secure an edge on Latin American 
routes. CMA-CGM also continues to invest to expand its market share and strengthen 
its competitiveness by acquisition of APL, Sofrana and Mercosul in 2016 and 2017. 
Both companies have been growing in size in the past two decades. Since shipping 
services by nature are hard to differentiate, shipping companies thus seek for 
economies of scale to gain upper hand. As a result, they seek to reduce costs through 
upsizing of vessels. 
 
-. 2014-CMA CGM and MSC formed an alliance 
-. 2014-CMA CGM SA bought OPDR 
-. 2014-CMA CGM Maersk and MSC formed the P3 alliance 
-. 2015-CMA CSCL and UASC formed the O3 alliance 
-. 2016-CMA CGM SA bought NOL, parent of APL 
-. 2017-CMA CGM SA bought Mercosul Line and Sofrana 
-. 2018-CMA CGM, COSCO-OOCL and Evergreen formed the Ocean alliance 
-. 2019-CMA CGM SA bought Containerships 
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Fig.4-6 Total TEU of Fleets Owned by Maersk 
Source: Alphaliner-TOP100-(2010-2013); Drewry Container Forecaster(2014-2019) 
 
 
Fig.4-7 Total TEU of Fleets Owned by CMA-CGM 
Source :Drewry Container Forecaster(2012、2014、2016、2018、2020) 
 
In summary, through M&A and strategic alliances, shipping companies have been 
driven into free competition. Larger vessels have enabled shipping companies to 
reduce unit cost but at the same time overcapacity also reduced freight rate 
dramatically. Joining alliance also triggered shipping companies to order mega-size 
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These factors have resulted in decline of freight rate, as shown in Figure 4-8 & 4-9, 
both CCFI and SCFI started to decline from 2010. Even though strategic alliances 
have made possible for shipping companies to reduce investment in shipbuilding and 
to invest in other supporting industries, such as terminals, effect of declined freight 
rate is higher than returns from supporting industries. 
 
 
Fig.4-8: CCFI, SCFI, Net Profit of Maersk 
Source: Drewry Container Forecaster(2012、2014、2016、2018、2020) 
 
 
Fig. 4-9: CCFI, SCFI, Net Profit of Maersk & CMA-CGM 



















2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
















2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
CCFI (left) SCFI (left) Net profit of CMA-CGM ($ million, right)
 
 32  
5. From Conference to Alliances: Regulatory 
The abolishment of shipping conferences and the rise of strategic/global alliances 
could be explained to some extent from the regulatory perspectives.  
 
5.1 Why Shipping Conference Failed 
Shipping conferences control the competition among member companies by 
stipulating freight rate, number of trips, tonnages and ports of call; offering shippers 
certain preferential treatments such as discounts, rebates, delay rebates, and contract 
preference, in order to control the supply of goods and monopolize routes. That is to 
say, shipping conferences maintained their status in the liner market with advantages 
of freight rates and stability of capacity supply. Thus, it was important for shipping 
companies that generated profits through the operation of container vessels to join a 
shipping conference. 
However, in the last decade, the role of shipping conferences gradually declined. Only 
18 percent of existing conference agreements are involved in the main routes, and 
almost half of these agreements involve the North-South routes and intraregional 
services. The number of carriers involved in main route conference agreements 
ranges from only two carriers to more than 10 in a few cases. And the majority of the 
carriers are small-medium sized companies (United Nations 2016). Eventually, 
shipping conferences began to collapse in 1998 due to the adoption of the Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act in the United States, and in 2008 when the European Union 
announced the abolition of shipping conferences. 
(1) US Regulatory Impact  
In 1984, shipping conferences were still not subject to the antitrust, as the Shipping 
Act of 1984 banned the dual rate system permitted by the Shipping Act of 1961. And 
the Shipping Act of 1984 imposed the individual rate system of independent action, 
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under which conference member carriers did not necessarily have to follow fixed rate 
of conference. 
After the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) was adopted in 1998, shipping 
companies were able to use confidential contracts as competitive tools against other 
companies. They permit individual members to negotiate independently with 
confidential service contracts, and prohibits any kind of retaliatory actions against 
shippers or other carriers. As a result, independent service contracts are now main 
way to have contract of the maritime transport between shippers and carriers (OECD, 
2015). But the effect may vary depending on the bargaining power of shippers. 
To align with this, the Antitrust Modernization Commission, which was established in 
the House of Representatives in 2004, recommended in its final report in April 2007 
that the exclusion of the Antitrust Act could not be recognized in principle, and strict 
restriction should be placed on shipping conferences. In 2010, James Oberstar, a 
member of the US House of Representatives, proposed a new maritime operation 
that prohibited negotiations or discussions among shipping companies within the form 
of coalition. This was the starting point for the weakening of the Transpacific 
Stabilization Agreement in the US. 
(2) EU Regulatory Impact  
In 1987, EU Council of Regulation 4056/86 recognized the principle of maritime 
competition and the exception of the “block exemption” as a rule on the detailed rules 
for applying sea transport to Article 81 and 82. It prohibits collusion that excludes 
substantial competition, joint actions in response to technological and economic 
development or damage to users’ interests, interfere in shipping operations of third 
countries’ by imposing unfair freight transport on EU member states, and obstructing 
contracts by limiting the types of cargo reservation or ships. It stipulates that the 
application for shipping conferences is excluded when it is aimed at international 
competitiveness or technological development of the shipping industry. In other words, 
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shipping conferences are excluded from this regulation because they are designed to 
stabilize the market and to provide reliable and reasonable services to shippers, which 
is impossible without mutual cooperation between shipping companies. 
To be specific, there are four conditions for the exemption of shipping conferences. 
First, the restrictive agreement should contribute to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress. Second, 
consumers must be compensated for the negative effects resulting from the restriction 
of competition. Third, the conduct must not impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of its objectives. Forth, the 
conference should remain subject to effective competitive constraints. 
However, as the environment of the shipping industry began to change significantly, 
the exemption of price fixing and supply control in the liner shipping market which are 
the results of increased cooperation between shipping companies in the form of 
conference, was required to be reviewed. Therefore, in 2003, the European Union 
reviewed Regulation 4056/86 to check whether the exemption of price fixing and 
supply control was still a necessary action. They ended up with finding no positive 
correlations between service qualities and price fixing, on the contrary, abrogating 
price fixing would improve the service quality. Therefore, in year 2006, to replace 
Regulation 4056/86, EU adopted Regulation 1419/2006 which came into effect from 
October 2008. 
To conclude, the reason why shipping conferences first appeared is that the shipping 
industry is a capital-intensive industry and there are certain risks with navigation. The 
form of shipping conference contributes to the stability of this industry and ensures 
that shippers can obtain reliable services. However, with the development of the 
industry, the market monopoly caused by the shipping conferences damaged the 
social welfare of shippers and reduced the efficiency of the industry. This violated the 
essential reasons for immunity; thus, shipping conferences could no longer enjoy 
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monopoly immunity. 
 
5.2 Why Strategic Alliance Matters  
As mentioned above, the role of conferences declined with only a few conference 
agreements involving main trade routes. Instead, increasing main routes were being 
served by other cooperation agreements, mainly strategic alliances. Through this 
process of change, the strategic alliance has emerged as a substitute for the 
conference. 
It became operational in the 1990s.A strategic alliance is to form a complementary 
and continuous cooperative relationship based on the unique competitive advantage 
of each company. In other words, since major liner companies are unable to establish 
a global logistics service network on their own in a short period of time, they form a 
group of shipping companies to work with others, then quickly react to the 
globalization of service and efficiently operate their fleets. 
The biggest difference between the shipping conference and the strategic alliance is 
that the shipping conference is formed through the control of the volume of ships and 
price fixing; but the strategic alliance mainly aimed at sharing the shipping volume 
and route resources through joint operation without such control or conciliation. The 
participating members of an alliance could continue to have their own identities, and 
their sales, marketing and customer service handled by separate commercial 
departments, which means they still could compete on freight rate. This means the 
existence of strategic alliance does not violate the antitrust rules. 
As arrangements among member carriers of strategic alliances do not involve freight 
rate fixing, many administrations confer them exemptions. In June 2014, the 
European Commission declared there have not been found of any violation of anti-
competitive issues in forming P3 alliances, which formed by Maersk, MSC and CMA 
CGM. However, the Chinese competition authorities rejected the P3 alliance after 
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reviewing the alliance under China’s merger control rules. This reveals that the 
strategic alliance is subject to the regulation and supervision of the authorities on 
competition law, and the authorities have the power to review and prohibit specific 
violations. In such cases, member carriers cooperate to improve operation efficiency, 
and competition authorities ensure sufficient competition in the market so that the cost 
savings are ultimately be burden of shippers. 
In summary, strategic alliances emerged in a changing era of shipping industry. During 
period of fluctuating freight rates, increasing operational costs and overcapacity. The 
rise of strategic alliances was a much-needed “huddling for warmth”. But more 
importantly, forming a strategic alliance is not a market monopoly, indicating strategic 
alliances would not undermine market competition, as shipping conferences did. 
In industrial organization theory, there is a concept of “workable competition” which 
means to seek industrial economies of scale while maintaining competition. The form 
of strategic alliances is consistent with this concept, as member carriers join together 
to improve the utilization of fleet capacity and route resources in the premise of no 
collusions. And that may be why strategic alliances could replace shipping 
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6. Conclusion 
Shipping industry has been experienced different type of formation from traditional 
shipping conference to recent strategic alliances. The major impact of formation 
change is the traditional shipping conference is mainly about control of volumes but 
strategic alliance is more about sharing the volume with their members. Shipping 
conference had different mode in operation which were focused on rate, freight and 
contracts. Meanwhile, strategic alliance focuses on how to share vessel and spaces 
and eventually set a unique service route for their alliance. Therefore, shipping 
conference tries to eliminate the inner competition as much as possible but strategic 
alliance tries to expand the service route with collaboration with its members and to 
optimize their profit. 
In terms of scale economy, unit cost compared to the vessel size varies dramatically, 
therefore, container vessel operators continuously try to build and operate larger 
vessels to achieve economies of scale. Developing transportation mode, hub and 
spoke can also be a reason for building bigger size vessel. With development of hub 
and spoke model, shipping companies focused on maximizing loading regional 
cargos to be discharged to the hub ports within their service routes. In order to 
maximize loading bigger size vessel became mandatory. Due to the fact that maritime 
shipping industry is high capital intensive, it would be burden for single shipping 
company could not enjoy the economy of scale by building mega-size vessel. To cope 
with this problem multiple shipping companies decided to form an alliance. The 
alliance also guarantees members to provide faster loading, discharging and trans-
shipping utilization through use of their own terminals. Therefore, the strategic 
alliances strengthen the competitiveness of the shipping company in related with the 
economy scale. 
As described, using Porter’s Diamond Model, there were some differences on 
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reacting on certain factors between shipping conference and strategic alliance such 
as operating cost, service diversification, bargaining power, monopolistic or free 
market competition. Now, as a result, major shipping companies are now in a strategic 
alliances and market share of those alliances is continuously growing and resulting 
intensify of market competition. To achieve upper-hand competitiveness, shipping 
companies are seeking to upscale by M&A and larger vessels. This has triggered 
formation of 3 global alliances in 2017 which have over 80% of market share in global 
capacity. 
According to the case of Maersk and CMA-CGM, both global shipping companies 
have experienced large scale of M&A for past two decades and join of alliances at the 
same time. This have resulted bigger in capacity and larger in vessel size for both 
shipping lines. As a consequence, shipping companies enjoyed a lot of reduced unit 
cost per shipping but unfortunately there have been dramatic decline of freight rate 
due to overcapacity. 
As previous shipping conference has been abolished due to that it triggers monopoly 
in market and related damages were under shippers account, as a freight, this violated 
the essential reasons for immunity. Shipping conference aims to control the volume 
of ships and freight rate, while strategic alliance aims on sharing shipping volume 
under joint operation. Which has huge difference in whether members are in 
competition status or not. Members between same strategic alliances are still 
considered as separated companies with independent rules and strategies. This is 
why the strategic alliance does not violate antitrust rules. 
As a result, in this era of overcapacity and low freight rate, it is essential for shipping 
companies to join strategic alliance. This can be considered as same as “workable 
competition” which is seeking to enjoy economy of scale while have competitive 
position among the members. 
In terms of research methodology, this paper conducted by confining it to the research 
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of literature. In order to be more objectively recognized, it is necessary to reflect the 
current reality more actively through interviews or surveys of shipping companies or 
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